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1. Introduction
Extant studies presume that there is a one-to-one mapping from a change in the
equilibrium allocation to a change in welfare. The aim of this paper is to show
that the premise need not hold in various models of monopolistic competition.
More precisely, we show that for any given change in the equilibrium allocation
there are infinitely many possible welfare changes when the mass of varieties
consumed differs between the two equilibria.
This one-to-many mapping arises for two reasons: the change in equilib-
rium, driven by an exogenous shock, is invariant to some class of transformations
of the subutility function of each variety; and the associated welfare change
depends on this class of transformations when consumption diversity changes.
These two results can be explained as follows. First, there exist transforma-
tions that do not affect the two conditions used for deriving the Marshallian
demand function at equilibrium, namely that the budget constraint is satisfied
with equality, and that the marginal rate of substitution equals the relative
price. Therefore, the equilibrium allocation, and thus the change in the equi-
librium allocation, are invariant to these transformations.
Second, such transformations, however, alter the Hicksian demand function
by influencing the contribution of each variety to the utility constraint of the
expenditure minimization problem. Thus, different transformations reflecting
different values of an additional variety generate different expenditure func-
tions without affecting the change in equilibrium. As a result, the associated
welfare change, as measured by the expenditure functions, is not uniquely
determined without knowing the exact contribution of each variety to utility.
Our finding has important implications for welfare assessments in models
of monopolistic competition. Since there are infinitely many possible transfor-
mations of the subutility function that are consistent with any given change
in the equilibrium allocation, we need to choose the “right” transformation to
measure the welfare change. Yet, it does not affect the equilibrium and can
thus hardly be identified. Even if we could identify the true transformation, it
would not need to be identical to the one implicitly used in the literature. Thus,
existing welfare evaluations based on a particular choice of transformation
need to be qualified as they can under- or overestimate the true welfare change.
2
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set the
stage by deriving our key results for the case of the subutility function with
constant elasticity of substitution (ces). Since the seminal work by Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977), this specification has been used in many fields of economics
such as trade, growth, and geography (e.g., Krugman, 1980; Grossman and
Helpman, 1993; Matsuyama, 1995; Melitz, 2003). More recently, the case with
variable elasticity of substitution (ves) has attracted increasing attention (e.g.,
Zhelobodko, Kokovin, Parenti, and Thisse, 2012; Dhingra and Morrow, 2014).
Therefore, in Section 3, we analyze the case of general subutility functions. We
first derive a class of transformations that do not affect the equilibrium allo-
cation in Section 3.1, and then show in Section 3.2 that those transformations
however do affect welfare evaluation. In Section 4, we extend our key results
and relate them to special cases that have been considered in the literature.
Section 5 concludes.
2. ces subutility function
Consider an economy with a single consumption good, supplied as a continu-
um of differentiated varieties. Let [0,N ] and qi  0 denote the potential range
of varieties and the consumption of variety i. We define the utility function as
U =
Z N
0
 (u(qi))di,
where u(qi) = q
( 1)/
i with  > 1 is the ces subutility function and  is
a monotonic transformation of u.1 Throughout the paper, we assume that
(u(0)) = 0,  is continuously differentiable, and   u is strictly increasing
and strictly concave. In this section we consider
(u(qi)) =
(
a+ bu(qi) for qi 2 (",¥)R u(qi)
0  (t)dt for qi 2 [0, "]
, (1)
1Most existing studies using the ces subutility function (e.g., Krugman, 1980; Melitz, 2003)
assume that (u(qi)) = u(qi), and that the utility function is given by [
R N
0 q
( 1)/
i di]
/( 1).
This is a monotonic transformation G of our utility function U , with G(U ) = U/( 1), which
yields the same welfare change than ours for any given shock. We thus disregard such a
transformation in this section. We return to this point in Section 3.
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where a  0, b > 0, and " > 0. When a = 0, b = 1, and " is small enough,
(u(qi)) boils down “almost everywhere” to the ces function that is widely
used in the literature. Note that, even when a 6= 0 and b 6= 1, (u(qi)) displays
ces for all qi 2 (",¥). Note also that if a = 0, b = 1, and  (t) = 1 for all t, then
(u(qi)) = u(qi) for all qi 2 [0,¥), which corresponds to the untransformed
case.
For  in (1) to meet the assumptions mentioned above, we assume that  
satisfies the following three conditions: (i)  > 0 and  0  0; (ii) R u(")0  (t)dt =
a+ bu("); and (iii)  (u("))u0(") = bu0("). Condition (i) ensures that (u(qi))
is strictly increasing and strictly concave not only for qi 2 (",¥) but also for
qi 2 [0, "]. Condition (ii) implies that the left and right limits coincide at qi = ",
so that (u(qi)) is continuous for all qi 2 [0,¥). Condition (iii) finally implies
that the left and right derivatives of (u(qi)) coincide at qi = ", so that (u(qi))
is differentiable for all qi 2 [0,¥). We show in Appendix A.1 how to construct
a function  satisfying conditions (i) to (iii) for any given " > 0.
Figure 1 depicts an example of  for some given ". As one can see, the idea is
to take an affine transformation of the ces subutility function u(qi) = q
( 1)/
i
for qi 2 (",¥) and to complement it with
R u(qi)
0  (t)dt that is strictly increasing
and strictly concave for qi 2 [0, "] (the dotted part below "). This “almost
affine” transformation changes the contribution of each variety to utility, yet as
shown below leaves the marginal rate of substitution and the budget constraint
unchanged when qi > " for all varieties produced in the economy. We will
show that there exists an " > 0 such that the equilibrium consumption satisfies
qi > " for all varieties produced in the economy.
We assume that consumers supply one unit of labor inelastically. Let w > 0
and pi > 0 denote the wage rate and the price of variety i. Each consumer
solves the following utility maximization problem
max
fqi, i2[0,N ]g
U =
Z N
0
(u(qi))di
s.t.
Z N
0
piqidi = w,
qi  0 8i 2 [0,Np],
qi = 0 8i 2 (Np,N ],
4
Figure 1: An illustration of the (u(qi)) function.
0 "
a
R u(qi)
0  (t)dt
a+ bu(qi)
u(qi)
qi
(u(qi))
where Np > 0 is the mass of varieties produced in the economy. Since our
results hold irrespective of the determinants of Np, we abstract from those
determinants in what follows.2 The constraint qi = 0 for all i 2 (Np,N ] implies
that varieties that are not supplied cannot be consumed. Letting  be the
marginal utility of income, the first-order condition for variety i 2 [0,Np] is
given by
0(u(qi))u0(qi)  pi. (2)
We can choose " > 0 in (1) such that qi > " for all i 2 [0,Np], which
implies that (2) must hold with equality for all i 2 [0,Np]. This can be seen
as follows. First, from condition (iii) above, we know that 0(u("))u0(") =
 (u("))u0(") = bu0(") = b[(   1)/]" 1/, which is strictly decreasing in "
2In most models of monopolistic competition, the determinants include population size and
fixed costs for production or entry. Thus, changes in population size or fixed costs affect the
mass Np of varieties supplied.
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and which can be made arbitrarily large for a sufficiently small ". Second, let
pmax  maxi2[0,NP ]fpig denote the maximum price. Then, since pmax < ¥, we
can choose " > 0 in (1) such that the first-order condition (2) is violated at ":
0(u("))u0(") > pmax. (3)
Last, by concavity of   u, the solution to 0(u(qi))u0(qi) = (  u)0(qi) = pi
must be such that qi > " for all i 2 [0,Np].
When qi > " holds for all i 2 [0,Np],  is independent of " and implicitly
defined as Z Np
0
pi  ((  u)0) 1(pi)di = w, (4)
where the mass Np of varieties produced is the same as the mass N of
varieties consumed. We thus denote Np by N . Since (u(qi)) displays
ces for qi 2 (",¥), equation (4) yields a closed form solution  = [b(  
1)/][w/P (N)1 ] 1/, where P (N) = [
R N
0 p
1 
i di]
1/(1 ) is the ces price
aggregate.
Furthermore, we can explicitly derive the threshold value " below which
we obtain qi > " for all i 2 [0,N ]. Indeed, plugging the solution for  into
(3), we have " < (pmax) P (N) 1w. Thus, " = (pmax) P (N) 1w, where
the right-hand side is exogenous to consumers because N = Np. Since the
maximum price pmax, the price aggregate P (N), and the wage w are strictly
positive and finite, " must be strictly positive. Hence, there exists an " 2 (0, ")
such that qi > " for all i 2 [0,N ]. Note that in the symmetric case, in which all
prices are the same, the threshold reduces to " = w/(Np).
In the remainder of this section, we thus assume that " < " and focus on the
case with qi > " and (u(qi)) = a+ bq
( 1)/
i . Then, the first-order condition
for variety i 2 [0,N ] is given by b[(  1)/]q 1/i = pi, so that
qi
qj
  1
=
pi
pj
for varieties i, j 2 [0,N ]. The marginal rate of substitution between any two
varieties is thus unaffected by the transformation . This, together with the
budget constraint, which is also unaffected by , implies that the Marshallian
demand function for qi > " is independent of a and b: qi = p i P (N) 1w. Let
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qmin  mini2[0,N ]fqig denote the minimum consumption. Then, the condition
" < " can be restated as " < "  qmin = (pmax) P (N) 1w. In the symmetric
case, in which all prices are the same, the inequality becomes " < " = q =
w/(Np).
To sum up, when the subutility function is of the ces form, there always
exists an " 2 (0, ") such that qi = p i P (N) 1w > " for all i 2 [0,N ] with
N = Np. Hence, the values of a and b do not affect the Marshallian demand
function for qi > ".
Since a and b are parameters of the utility function, they do not appear
in the supply side of the economy. Hence, given the Marshallian demand
function, the first-order condition for profit maximization, as well as the free
entry condition and the resource constraint, is unaffected by a and b. Con-
sequently, the equilibrium allocation, and thus the change in the equilibrium
allocation driven by some shocks that affect the mass of varieties supplied, are
independent of a and b.
The important point to note, however, is that the welfare change due to
such shocks depends on a and b. To see this, we consider the expenditure
minimization problem subject to the target utility level U as follows:
min
fqi, i2[0,N ]g
Z N
0
piqidi
s.t.
Z N
0
(u(qi))di = U ,
qi  0 8i 2 [0,Np],
qi = 0 8i 2 (Np,N ],
where Np > 0 is the mass of varieties produced in the economy and the
constraint qi = 0 for all i 2 (Np,N ] implies that varieties that are not supplied
cannot be consumed.
As before we assume that " 2 (0, "), so that (u(qi)) = a+ bq( 1)/i for
all i 2 [0,Np] and N = Np hold. We then obtain the compensated demand
function as follows:
q
 
pi,P (N),U ,A(N), b

= p i P (N)


U  A(N)
b
 
 1
,
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where A(N) = Na. The expenditure function is then given by
e
 
P (N),U ,A(N), b

= P (N)

U  A(N)
b
 
 1
. (5)
With a = 0 and b = 1, expression (5) reduces to e(P (N),U) = P (N)U/( 1),
which is independent of A(N) and b. Holding U constant, we take the rate of
change of (5) to define the welfare change between two equilibria as follows:3
  d ln e =  d lnP (N) + 
  1
Na
b
R N
0 q
( 1)/
i di
d lnN , (6)
which measures by how much consumers can reduce expenditure in response
to some shocks affecting the mass of varieties supplied.4 Using a more general
model, we show in Section 3 that (6) is the same as either equivalent or
compensating variation for small shocks (marginal changes).
Expression (6) illustrates our main result: the mapping from a change in the
equilibrium mass of varieties d lnN to a change in welfare  d ln e is one-to-many,
depending on the values of a and b. To see this one-to-many mapping more clearly,
consider a special case in which all firms have common marginal cost mw,
where m is the constant marginal labor requirement and the wage rate w is
taken as the numeraire. Given the ces markup pricing pi = [/(  1)]mw, we
then have the rate of change in the price aggregate as follows:
d lnP (N) =
1
1  d lnN , (7)
3When a = 0, expression (6) can be related to the change in the expenditure function used
by, e.g., Feenstra (1994) and Redding and Weinstein (2016) to measure the impacts of new
varieties on welfare.
4When the utility function is transformed as G(U ) = U/( 1), the expenditure function
becomes
e(P (N),U ,A(N), b) = P (N )
24U  1  A(N )
b
35  1 .
The welfare change is unaffected by G because U is held constant and does not enter (6).
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because N is the only endogenous variable in P (N).5 Imposing symmetry on
qi and plugging (7) into (6), the welfare change becomes
  d ln e = 1
  1
 
1+
a
bq
 1

!
d lnN . (8)
The second term in the parenthesis captures the differential welfare effect
of having non-zero a terms for the varieties: for any change in the equilibrium
mass of varieties d lnN , there exist infinitely many possible welfare changes  d ln e,
depending on the values of a and b. The larger the value of a, the greater the
welfare impact of a change in the mass of varieties. Note that when a 6= 0, the
value of b also matters for the welfare change.
The existing literature takes it for granted that there is a one-to-one mapping
from d lnN to  d ln e by implicitly assuming that a = 0 holds (e.g., Krugman,
1980; Grossman and Helpman, 1993; Melitz, 2003). Indeed, when a = 0, the
relationship between the change in the equilibrium allocation and the change
in welfare reduces to  d ln e =  d lnP (N) = [1/(   1)]d lnN . Thus, as
before, consumers spend less to achieve the target utility level U when the
mass of varieties increases due to some exogenous shock, i.e., d lnN > 0,
d lnP (N) < 0, and  d ln e > 0. However, how much less they spend is
uniquely determined by the value of the elasticity of substitution  because
 d ln e does not depend on the values of a and b. This conventional welfare
measure underestimates the welfare change if the true transformation of the
subutility function involves a positive a term. In Section 4we will also illustrate
a case where this widely used measure can overestimate the welfare change.
Our results reveal a fundamental difficulty in measuring welfare changes:
the information on the equilibrium allocations before and after a shock does
not allow us to evaluate welfare changes when varieties are endogenous. The
5When marginal cost m differs across firms (e.g., Melitz, 2003), equation (7) is given by
d lnP (N) =
1
1  
"
1
N
Z N
0

mi
mN
1 
di
# 1
d lnN ,
which depends not only on the change in the mass of varieties but also on the relative efficiency
of the marginal firm. Since the latter is exogenous, our main result holds for the case with
heterogeneous firms.
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reasons are that observing the two equilibrium quantities qi = 0 and qi 2 (",¥)
is not sufficient to capture the exact contribution of each variety to utility, and
that the Marshallian demand function can depend on the values of a and b
only when qi 2 (0, "]. Thus, in principle, if we could observe the Marshallian
demand function for all qi 2 [0,¥) for all new varieties i 2 (N ,N + dN ], we
could use Roy’s identity to obtain the indirect utility function, which in turn
could be solved for the expenditure function associated with the observed de-
mand function (Hausman, 1981). However, in practice, this is very demanding
since it requires observations qi 2 (0, "] that do not realize in equilibrium.6
3. General subutility functions
The example in the previous section was built for the specific case of the ces
subutility function. We now show that our results extend to general subutility
functions u. As in Section 2, we consider an economy with a single consump-
tion good, supplied as a continuum of differentiated varieties. Preferences are
additively separable across varieties. We denote by [0,N ] the potential range
of varieties in the economy, and by [0,Np], with Np < N , the range of varieties
produced.
Let pi > 0 and qi  0 denote the price and the consumption of variety
i 2 [0,N ]. Let u be a strictly increasing and strictly concave, twice continuously
differentiable subutility function that satisfies u(0) = 0. Each consumer solves
the following utility maximization problem:
max
fqi, i2[0,N ]g
U = G
 Z N
0
 (u(qi))di
!
s.t.
Z N
0
piqidi = w,
qi  0, 8i 2 [0,Np],
qi = 0, 8i 2 (Np,N ],
6What is worse, the function  , which characterizes the Marshallian demand function for
qi 2 (0, "], is not uniquely determined. We illustrate one example in Appendix A. Yet, there are
many other possible specifications for  that affect qi 2 (0, "] while keeping the Marshallian
demand function evaluated at equilibrium points, qi = 0 and qi 2 (",¥), unchanged.
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where G is a positive monotonic transformation of the utility function and the
constraint qi = 0 for all i 2 (Np,N ] implies that varieties that are not supplied
cannot be consumed. As in Section 2, we assume that (u(0)) = 0, that 
is continuously differentiable, and that   u is strictly increasing and strictly
concave.
In this section we consider a general case
(u(qi)) =
(
F (u(qi)) for qi 2 (",¥)R u(qi)
0  (t)dt for qi 2 [0, "]
, (9)
where, unlike equation (1), u need not be of the ces form and F need not be
an affine transformation of u. Note that if F (u(qi)) = u(qi) and  (t) = 1 for
all t, then (u(qi)) = u(qi), which corresponds to the untransformed case.
For  in (9) to meet the assumptions mentioned above, we assume that  
satisfies the following three conditions: (i)  > 0 and  0  0; (ii) R u(")0  (t)dt =
F (u(")); and (iii)  (u("))u0(") = F 0(u("))u0("), where we impose F 0(u(")) > 0.
Condition (i) ensures that (u(qi)) is strictly increasing and strictly concave for
all qi  0. Conditions (ii) and (iii) are required for continuity and differentia-
bility of (u(qi)) for all qi  0. We show in Appendix A.2 how to construct a
function  satisfying conditions (i) to (iii) for any given " > 0.
Let  denote the marginal utility of income. The first-order condition for
variety i 2 [0,Np] is given by
0(u(qi))u0(qi)  epi, (10)
where e  /G0(). As in Section 2, we can show under what conditions there
exists " > 0 such that qi > " for all i 2 [0,Np], so that (10) holds with equality
for all i 2 [0,Np]. This can be seen as follows. First, from condition (iii) above,
we know that 0(u("))u0(") =  (u("))u0(") = F 0(u("))u0("), which is strictly
decreasing in " because by assumption   u is a strictly concave function.
Second, let pmax  maxi2[0,NP ]fpig. Contrary to the ces case in Section 2, the
marginal utility at qi = " may be bounded even when " gets arbitrarily small,
i.e., lim"!0+ F 0(u("))u0(") < ¥ may hold. A sufficient condition for qi > " to
hold for all i 2 [0,Np] is given by
F 0(u("))u0(") > epmax (11)
11
because, by concavity of F  u, the solution to F 0(u(qi))u0(qi) = epi must be
such that qi > " for all i 2 [0,Np].
Assume that condition (11) is satisfied. Then, equation (10) must hold with
equality for all i 2 [0,Np], which can be restated as F 0(u(qi))u0(qi) = epi for
all i 2 [0,Np]. In that case, e is independent of " and implicitly defined asZ Np
0
pi  ((F  u)0) 1(epi)di = w, (12)
where the mass Np of varieties produced is the same as the mass N of varieties
consumed. Note that, by concavity of F  u, the solution for e(p,N ,w) in
(12) exists and is uniquely determined, where p is a vector of statistics that
characterizes the distribution of prices fpigi2[0,N ].7
Furthermore, we can pin down the threshold value " below which condition
(11) holds. Indeed, plugging e(p,N ,w) into (11), and noting that F 0(u("))u0(")
is decreasing in ", we know that " < "(pmax,p,N ,w), where (pmax,p,N ,w)
are exogenous to consumers because N = Np. In Section 3.1 we restate the
sufficient condition (11) to ensure qi > " for all i 2 [0,Np] by using Marshallian
demand functions, and derive a closed form solution for " in the symmetric
case. We also illustrate a closed form solution for " in an asymmetric case in
Appendix B.
In the remainder of this section, we assume that " < " holds, which allows
us to focus on the case with qi > " and thus with (u(qi)) = F (u(qi)).
3.1 Identifying a class of monotonic transformations that do not affect the
equilibrium allocation
We now identify a class of monotonic transformations F that do not affect
the Marshallian demand functions and, therefore, the equilibrium allocation
fqi, 8i 2 [0,N ]g. Since we consider the case in which " < ", we have qi > " for
all i 2 [0,N ], so that the first-order conditions for utility maximization with
respect to qi and qj imply that
F 0 (u(qi)) u0(qi)
F 0 (u(qj)) u0(qj)
=
pi
pj
(13)
7In the ces case of Section 2, p is unidimensional and subsumed by the price aggregate
P (N).
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for i, j 2 [0,N ]. Expression (13) shows that the monotonic transformation G
of the utility function does not affect the marginal rate of substitution between
varieties i and j. Combining (13) and the budget constraint, the Marshallian
demand function for each variety is invariant to G, reflecting the well-known
property that the utility is ordinal. However, as can be seen from (13), the same
does not generally apply to the monotonic transformation F of the subutility
function.
We analyze under what conditions F does not affect the Marshallian de-
mand functions and thus the equilibrium allocation is invariant to the trans-
formation. To this end, we first consider the benchmark case without the
transformation, i.e., F (u(qi)) = u(qi) for all i 2 [0,N ]. We then have F 0  1, so
that expression (13) becomes:
u0(qi)
u0(qj)
=
pi
pj
(14)
for i, j 2 [0,N ]. Hence, the monotonic transformation F of the subutility
function does not affect the marginal rate of substitution, i.e., expressions (13)
and (14) are equivalent, if and only if
F 0 (u(qi))  F 0 (u(qj)) , 8qi, qj > ". (15)
Condition (15) holds if and only if F is of the following form:
F (u(qi)) = a+ b u(qi), 8qi > ". (16)
To prove this result, assume that (16) holds. Then, it is easy to see that
(15) holds. Conversely, assume that (15) holds. Then, for any given qi > ",
F 0 (u(qi)) = F 0 (u(qj)) must hold regardless of qj > ", so that F 0 (u(qi)) = C,
where C is a constant. This differential equation implies a general solution of
the form in (16).8 In what follows, we assume that a  0, and that b > 0.
It can be verified that when (16) holds, the monotonic transformation F of
the subutility function does not affect the equilibrium allocation. Indeed, in
that case, both (13) and (14) lead to
qj = (u
0) 1

u0(qi)
pj
pi

(17)
8In order to encompass the existing literature, we consider in Section 4 the case in which b
can be a function of the mass N of varieties consumed.
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for i, j 2 [0,N ]. Plugging this expression into the budget constraint and noting
that qi = 0 for all i 2 (N ,N ] yieldZ N
0
pj  (u0) 1

u0(qi)
pj
pi

dj = w (18)
for i 2 [0,N ], which implicitly defines the Marshallian demand function
qi = q(pi,p,N ,w), (19)
where p is a vector of statistics that characterizes the distribution of prices
fpigi2[0,N ]. As can be seen from (18), the demand function in (19) does not
depend on the transformation F of the subutility function. Since that transfor-
mation neither shows up in the cost function nor in the resource constraint, it
will not affect the equilibrium allocation fqi, 8i 2 [0,N ]g. Hence, we abstract
from the supply side of the economy.
Using the Marshallian demand function (19), the sufficient condition " <
"(pmax,p,N ,w) for qi > " to hold for all i 2 [0,N ] can be rewritten as " <
q(pmax,p,N ,w). This can be seen as follows. First, when " < "(pmax,p,N ,w)
holds, we obtain qi = (F  u)0(epi) for all i 2 [0,N ] from the first-order
condition. Since (F  u)0 is strictly decreasing by strict concavity of F  u and
since a change in any pi does not affect e due to the continuum assumption, qi
must decrease in pi. Let qmin  mini2[0,N ]fqig denote the minimum quantity.
Then, qmin = (F  u)0(epmax) = q(pmax,p,N ,w). Hence, qi > " for all i 2 [0,N ],
which is equivalent to qmin > ", holds when q(pmax,p,N ,w) > ". Alternatively,
the sufficient condition for such an " > 0 to exist can be restated as qmin > 0.
Given (pmax,p,N ,w), the threshold " or qmin = q(pmax,p,N ,w) can be
implicitly defined by using the budget constraint. Indeed, from the first-order
conditions for qi and qmin = ", we can restate the sufficient condition (11) for
qi > " to hold for all varieties produced as follows:
9" 2 (0, "), where " is given by
Z N
0
pj  (u0) 1

u0(")
pj
pmax

dj = w. (20)
In the symmetric case, where pi = p for all i 2 [0,N ], we can derive a closed
form solution " = w/(Np) > 0 from (20). Thus, there exists an " such
that " 2 (0, "). In asymmetric cases, we need to adjust for price dispersion.
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In Appendix B, we illustrate a closed form solution for " > 0 in such an
asymmetric case.9
We have hence shown the following result.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium invariance) Assume that u(0) = 0, u0 > 0, and u00 <
0, that F satisfies (16), and that condition (20) holds. Then, the positive monotonic
transformation  of the subutility function affects neither the Marshallian demand
functions nor the equilibrium allocation.
Proof See above.
Proposition 1 shows that there exists a class of monotonic transformations
 of the subutility function u that do not affect the equilibrium allocation and
thus the change in the equilibrium allocation. The reason for this result is
that the transformations satisfying (16) do not affect the two conditions for
deriving the Marshallian demand function at equilibrium, namely that the
budget constraint is satisfied with equality, and that the marginal rate of
substitution equals the relative price. Our result implies that the values of
a and b in (16) can hardly be identified from (the change in) the equilibrium
allocation. However, we show in Section 3.2 that without the information on a
and b welfare changes cannot be measured when varieties are endogenous.
3.2 Measuring welfare changes using the class of monotonic transformations
that do not affect the equilibrium allocation
We have so far identified the class of monotonic transformations that do not
affect the equilibrium allocation. We now show, however, that such transfor-
mations do affect welfare changes: for any change in the mass Np of varieties
supplied – and thus, given condition (20), for any change in the mass N
of varieties consumed – there exist infinitely many possible welfare changes
measured by the expenditure function.
9As shown in Behrens and Murata (2007), deriving a closed form solution from (20) requires
a separability property of (u0) 1. It is satisfied in the special cases of ces and constant absolute
risk aversion (cara).
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To see this, we start with the following expenditure minimization problem
subject to the target utility level U :
min
fqi, i2[0,N ]g
Z N
0
piqidi
s.t. G
 Z N
0
(u(qi))di
!
= U ,
qi  0 8i 2 [0,Np],
qi = 0 8i 2 (Np,N ],
where Np > 0 is the mass of varieties produced in the economy and the
constraint qi = 0 for all i 2 (Np,N ] implies that varieties that are not supplied
cannot be consumed.
As before we focus on the case in which there exists an " 2 (0, "), so that
(u(qi)) = F (u(qi)) for all i 2 [0,Np] and N = Np hold. Then, the first-
order conditions for expenditure minimization with respect to qi and qj for
i, j 2 [0,N ] imply (13). Focusing on the class of monotonic transformations in
(16), we then obtain (17) as before. Noting that qi = 0 for all i 2 (N ,N ], the
utility constraint becomesZ N
0
[a+ bu(qj)]dj = G 1(U), (21)
which, together with (17), can be rewritten as
A(N) + b
Z N
0
u

(u0) 1

u0(qi)
pj
pi

dj = G 1(U), (22)
where A(N) = Na. The compensated demand function is thus given by
qi = q
 
pi,p,N ,U ,A(N), b

, (23)
where p is a vector of statistics that characterizes the distribution of prices
fpigi2[0,N ]. Plugging (23) into the objective function, we obtain the expenditure
function as follows:
e
 
p,N ,U ,A(N), b

=
Z N
0
piq
 
pi,p,N ,U ,A(N), b

di. (24)
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In the standard case without the monotonic transformation F of the subutility
function, i.e., a = 0 and b = 1, we have
e
 
p,N ,U

=
Z N
0
piq
 
pi,p,N ,U

di. (25)
We measure welfare changes using the expenditure function (24), which
includes (25) as a special case. Holding the target utility level U constant,
we analyze by how much consumers can reduce their expenditure after a
shock that affects fp,Ng and, therefore, A(N). We know from Proposition 1
under which conditions the equilibrium allocation is invariant to a monotonic
transformation . When these conditions are met before and after the shock,
the change in the equilibrium allocation is also unaffected by the transformation
.10 However, the values of a and b can affect welfare changes as shown by the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Welfare variance) Suppose that the assumptions in Proposition 1
hold. Then, the welfare change is given by
  d ln e =  
Z N
0
piqi
e
d ln pidi (26)
 
"
NpNqN
e
  Nu(qN )R N
0 u
0(qi)qidi
  Na
b
R N
0 u
0(qi)qidi
#
d lnN .
Thus, for any given change in the equilibrium mass of varieties d lnN , there exist
infinitely many possible welfare changes  d ln e, depending on the values of a and b.
Proof See Appendix C.
Several comments are in order. First, Proposition 2 implies that the welfare
change, driven by a change in N , is sensitive to the values of a and b. Except for
the special case with a = 0, any shock that affects the mass of varieties gener-
ates an additional welfare change as can be seen from (26). Since Proposition 1
shows that the values of a and b do not affect the equilibrium allocation (and
thus do not affect the change in N ), the commonly made assumption, a = 0
10If the conditions of Proposition 1 hold in the initial equilibrium, they will hold by conti-
nuity for small shocks that affect this equilibrium.
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and b = 1, may not be innocuous when it comes to measuring welfare changes.
Indeed, for any given change in N , there exist infinitely many possible welfare
changes depending on the values of a and b.
Second, since a can take any value between zero and infinity (and b can
take any positive value) without affecting the equilibrium, we need to identify
the values of a and b in order to uniquely pin down the welfare change.
However, as argued after Proposition 1, we can hardly identify those values
from the equilibrium allocation because the transformation  does not affect
the equilibrium allocation. Even if we could identify it, a need not be zero and
b need not be one. Therefore, existing results on welfare changes, driven by a
change in N , need to be qualified as they rely on a particular normalization.
Third, as shown in Appendix D, the welfare change  d ln e may be viewed
as either equivalent or compensating variation for small shocks (marginal
changes). To establish this relationship, we follow the standard practice that
w = 1 by choice of numeraire, both before and after the shock. Thus, our
results are not driven by the way we measure welfare changes.
Fourth, expression (26) applies to both ces and general subutilities. In-
deed, when pi does not depend on N , and when firms are symmetric so
that NpNqN = e, (26) boils down to (8). Both the ces and general cases
require qi > " for all i 2 [0,N ]. In both cases, a sufficient condition for
this to hold is given by " = qmin = q(pmax,p,N ,w) > ". In the ces case
q(pmax,p,N ,w) = (pmax) P (N) 1w, and therefore qmin > 0 regardless of
the values of (pmax,p,N ,w). Hence, there exists an " > 0 such that qmin > ".
In the case of general subutilities, however, qmin need not be strictly positive.
Thus, we need to focus on the set of (pmax,p,N ,w) to ensure qmin > 0. When
all prices are the same, this condition is satisfied since qmin = w/(Np) > 0
holds. When prices are different, we need to adjust for price dispersion (see
Appendix B).
Fifth, the extant literature using ces subutility regards variety expansion
in the consumption good as being equivalent to variety expansion in the
intermediate good or to a rise in total factor productivity due to specialization
(e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 1993, Chapter 3). However, our results suggest
that this reinterpretation relies on the implicit normalization, a = 0 and b = 1.
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Thus, the equivalence does not hold in general. In particular, in the case of the
intermediate good, the values of a and b affect the total output in equilibrium,
whereas in the case of the consumption good, the values of a and b do not
affect the equilibrium allocation while altering welfare evaluation.
Last, it is worth emphasizing that the change in consumption diversity,
d lnN 6= 0, over the variety space plays a crucial role in Proposition 2 as can be
seen from (26). Thus, our results do not apply to models with a fixed number
of varieties (e.g., Eaton and Kortum, 2002) or models in which new varieties are
defined over a characteristics space of some fixed dimension (e.g., Lancaster,
1966).
4. Extension
We have so far assumed that the monotonic transformation  does not depend
on N . To encompass the existing literature (e.g., Benassy, 1996; Blanchard and
Giavazzi, 2003), we now assume that  depends not only on u(qi) but also on
N . In that case, condition (20) need not be sufficient to ensure qi > " for all
i 2 [0,N ]. The reasons are that condition (20) is based on (11), and that the
latter abstracts from the impact of a new variety on the existing varieties. To
take such an impact into account we first impose the “love of variety” condition
for all varieties to be consumed, and then derive the condition for qi > " to hold
for all i 2 [0,Np].
Assume that the transformation of the subutility function in given by i 
(u(qi),N), where
(u(qi),N) =
(
F (u(qi),N) for qi 2 (",¥)R u(qi)
0  (t,N)dt for qi 2 [0, "]
.
Letting
i,u 
u
i
@i
@u
, i,N 
N
i
@i
@N
, and u,qi 
qi
u
@u
@qi
, (27)
we show in Appendix E that the “love of variety” condition is given byZ N
0
i
N

NpNqN
w
i,uu,qi   i,N

di  N . (28)
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Intuitively, condition (28) implies that the benefit of the marginal variety i = N
is no less than the cost of purchasing it. Note that i,N captures the impact of
a new variety on the existing varieties.
In Sections 2 and 3, we assume that i,N = 0. In that case, we show in
Appendix E that the “love of variety” condition reduces to
(  u)0(qN )  N
qN
, (29)
i.e., the marginal transformed utility is not greater than the average trans-
formed utility. Note that condition (29) holds since   u is assumed to be
concave. This result shows that if  is independent of N , the “love of variety”
condition always holds provided that   u is a concave function. Hence,
condition (20) is sufficient for our results in Sections 2 and 3.
When  depends on N , things are more complicated. The reason is that
adding a variety at the margin may reduce the value of all inframarginal
varieties. Thus, consumers need not consume all available varieties, in which
case condition (20) is violated. Recovering (20) requires the “love of variety”
condition (28) for all available varieties to be consumed, i.e., N = Np.
Let  be the marginal utility of income. The first-order condition for variety
i 2 [0,Np] is given by
@(u(qi),N)
@u
u0(qi)  epi, (30)
where e  /G0(). Assume that the “love of variety” condition (28) holds.
Since (28) ensures positive consumption for all i 2 [0,Np], we have N = Np, so
that (30) must hold with equality for all i 2 [0,Np]. Since Np is exogenous to
consumers, we can focus in the same way as in Sections 2 and 3 on the case in
which there exists an " 2 (0, ") such that qi > " for all i 2 [0,Np].
Assume " 2 (0, ") and consider an affine transformation of the ces subutility
function, i.e., (u(qi),N) = F (u(qi),N) = a+ b(N)q
( 1)/
i , where b depends
on the mass N of varieties consumed. In that case, (28) becomes
a
b(N)q
 1

+
Nb0(N)
b(N)
   1

, (31)
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where we impose symmetry across varieties (see Appendix E).11 When condi-
tion (31) holds, the welfare change is given by (see Appendix C)
  d ln e =  d lnP (N) + 
  1
"
a
b(N)q
 1

+
b0(N)N
b(N)
#
d lnN . (32)
The existing literature, based mostly on the ces subutility function, has
sometimes assumed different functional forms for b(N) for particular pur-
poses. We have shown in Section 2 that the ces case, with a = 0 and b(N) = b,
yields the welfare change
  d ln e =  d lnP (N) = 1
  1d lnN , (33)
where we have used (7). This can also be seen by setting a = 0 and b0(N) = 0
in (32). In this case, the welfare change depends solely on the value of .
As is well known, the parameter  plays two roles in the ces model: the
elasticity of substitution; and the “love of variety” effect, i.e., holding aggregate
consumption Nq fixed, an increase in N raises the utility level. To disentangle
the latter from the former, Benassy (1996) considers that G(x) = x/( 1),
 (t,N) = b(N), a = 0, and b(N) = N (+
1
1  )(
 1
 ) with  2 [0,¥), so that
U =
Z N
0
N (+
1
1  )(
 1
 )q
 1

i di
 
 1
. (34)
Thus, when varieties are symmetric, we have U = N(Nq) with the “love of
variety” effect being N . Since a = 0 and Nb0(N)/N = ( + 11  )(
 1
 ), the
“love of variety” condition (31) reduces to   0. In that case, our welfare
measure (32) becomes
  d ln e =  d lnP (N) +

 +
1
1  

d lnN =  d lnN , (35)
11Dixit and Stiglitz (1975, Section 4.4) derive a similar condition when a = 0 and when firms
are homogeneous. With a > 0 and with firm heterogeneity, the expression becomes
a
b(N )q
 1

N
+
Nb0(N )
b(N)
"
1
N
Z N
0

mi
mN
1 
di
#
   1

,
where N is the mass of varieties supplied in the economy and where mi and mN are marginal
labor requirements for producing varieties i and N , respectively. The foregoing expression
differs from the standard “love of variety” condition without firm heterogeneity, i.e., u0(q) 
u(q)/q, that depends solely on preferences.
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where we have used (7). This result shows that, depending on the value of
, the absolute value of the welfare change can take any value between zero
and infinity for a given change in the equilibrium mass of varieties d lnN .
Since a given shock generates the same change in the equilibrium allocation
for any value of   0, the benchmark case (33) overestimates the welfare
change as compared to (35) if  < 1/(   1) and underestimates it if  >
1/(   1) when the true utility function is given by (34). It is worth pointing
out that this result can be generalized to an arbitrary function b(N): b0(N) < 0
implies that (33) overestimates the welfare change and vice versa. One can even
completely neutralize the welfare effect of “love of variety” without affecting
the equilibrium allocation. To see this, assume that a = 0 and b(N) = N 1/
(see, e.g., Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003). This specification is a special case of
Benassy (1996), namely  = 0. In this case, our welfare measure (32), becomes
 d ln e =  d lnP (N) + 1
1  d lnN = 0,
where we have again used (7). In this specification, welfare is unaffected by
a shock that changes the mass of varieties as the positive effect via the price
aggregate P (N) is offset by the negative effect of the b(N) term.
These three simple cases show that there is a class of models that yield the
same change in the equilibrium allocation but predict substantially different
welfare changes. For any given change in N , the absolute value of the welfare
change can range from zero to infinity, depending on the assumption on b(N).
Thus, welfare evaluations based on specific normalizations in the existing
literature can over- or underestimate the true welfare change when varieties
are endogenous.
5. Concluding remarks
It is well known that preferences are invariant to any positive monotonic
transformation of a utility function. In this paper, we have shown that the
Marshallian demand function evaluated at equilibrium can remain invari-
ant to infinitely many transformations of a subutility function. While such
transformations do not affect the equilibrium allocation, they generate quite
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different welfare evaluations when consumption diversity varies. Thus, unless
we know the true transformation, it is impossible to pin down the magnitude
of the welfare change. Since the transformation does not affect the equilibrium
allocation, it can be hardly identified. Even if we could identify it, it need
not coincide with implicit normalizations made in the literature. Accordingly,
existing results on welfare changes with endogenous consumption diversity
need to be qualified.
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Appendix
The appendix is structured as follows. In Appendix A, we illustrate how to
construct a  function that satisfies the properties spelled out in the main
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text. Appendix B provides a closed-form solution for the threshold " in a ves
case. In Appendix C, we derive the general expression for the welfare change
between two equilibria. Appendix D establishes the equivalence between our
measure of welfare changes and equivalent and compensating variations. Last,
Appendix E deals with the “love of variety” condition.
Appendix A. Illustration of  
A.1. When (u(qi)) = a+ bu(qi) holds for qi > ". Assume that  in (1) satisfies
the following three conditions: (i)  > 0 and  0  0; (ii) R u(")0  (t)dt = a+
bu("); and (iii)  (u("))u0(") = bu0("), where u(") = "( 1)/. As an illustration,
assume that  (t) =    t. We can then find  > 0 and   0 such that
 satisfies conditions (i) to (iii) for any " > 0. To see this, let us start with
condition (ii), which implies that u(")  (/2)[u(")]2 = a+ bu("). Condition
(iii) implies that   u(") = b. These two conditions give a system of linear
equations in  and , which yields a unique solution
 =
2a
u(")
+ b > 0 and  =
2a
[u(")]2
 0.
Finally, since  0 =    0 and  (u(")) =    u(") = b > 0,  (u(qi)) is
strictly positive for all qi 2 [0, "]. Hence, condition (i) holds, which completes
the proof.
A.2. When (u(qi)) = F (u(qi)) holds for qi > ". Assume that  in (9) satisfies
the following three conditions: (i)  > 0 and  0  0; (ii) R u(")0  (t)dt = F (u("));
and (iii)  (u("))u0(") = F 0(u("))u0("). As an illustration, assume again that
 (t) =    t. We can then find  > 0 and   0 such that  satisfies
conditions (i) to (iii) for any " > 0. To see this, let us start with condition (ii),
which implies that u(")  (/2)[u(")]2 = F (u(")). Condition (iii) implies that
  u(") = F 0(u(")), where F 0  @F/@u. These two conditions give a system
of linear equations in  and , which yields a unique solution
 =
F (u("))
u(")

2  F
0(u("))u(")
F (u("))

> 0
 =
2F (u("))
[u(")]2

1  F
0(u("))u(")
F (u("))

 0,
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where the inequalities come from F 0(u("))u(")/F (u("))  1 since F is non-
convex by assumption. Finally, since  0 =    0 and  (u(")) =   u(") =
F 0(u(")) > 0,  (u(qi)) is strictly positive for all qi 2 [0, "]. Hence, condition (i)
holds, which completes the proof.
Appendix B. Illustration of a closed form solution for " > 0 in
an asymmetric case
To illustrate a closed form solution for " > 0 in an asymmetric case, consider
the cara subutility function u(qi) = 1  e qi as in Behrens and Murata (2007).
In that case, we can derive e from (12) as follows:
e(p,Np,w) = exp ln(b)  w
Npp
  1
Npp
Z Np
0
pi ln pidi

,
where p = (1/Np)
R Np
0 pidi is the average price. Hence, for qi > " to hold for
all i 2 [0,Np] in this asymmetric case, we need to choose " such that
" 2 (0, "), where "  1
Npp

w+
1

Z Np
0
pi ln

pi
pmax

di

. (36)
Thus, " can be expressed only in terms of the variables that are exogenous to
consumers. In the special case where pi = p = pmax for all i 2 [0,Np], " is given
by w/(Npp) = q, where q is the quantity in the symmetric case. Note that the
last equality comes from the budget constraint. Condition (36) tells us that in
the case of symmetric prices, we can choose any " 2 (0, q). When prices are
different, we need to adjust for price dispersion as in the second term of (36).
Clearly, for any given wage w, there is an upper bound on price dispersion
for " > 0 to exist. Conversely, for any price distribution (with pi > 0 for all
i 2 [0,Np]), there exists a wage rate such that " > 0 exists.
Appendix C. Derivation of the welfare change
C.1. Constant b. Totally differentiating the expenditure function (24), we can
define the welfare change as
  d ln e =  1
e
Z N
0
piqid ln pidi+NpNqNd lnN +
Z N
0
piqid ln qidi

, (37)
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where d ln qi involves all partial derivatives of the arguments of the compen-
sated demand function (23). Consider the transformation identified in (16)
and the utility constraint given by (21). Using A(N) = Na, the latter can be
rewritten as Z N
0
u(qi)di =
G 1(U) A(N)
b
.
Taking the rate of change of both sides, we have
u(qN )Nd lnNR N
0 u(qi)di
+
R N
0 u
0(qi)qid ln qidiR N
0 u(qi)di
=  A(N)d lnA(N)
b
R N
0 u(qi)di
. (38)
The first-order conditions for the expenditure minimization imply u0(qi)pj =
u0(qj)pi. Multiplying both sides by qj and integrating the resulting expression,
we have
u0(qi) =
pi
e
Z N
0
u0(qj)qjdj.
Plugging this expression into (38) yields
 
R N
0 piqid ln qidi
e
=
A(N)
b d lnA(N) + u(qN )Nd lnNR N
0 u
0(qj)qjdj
.
Finally, plugging this expression into (37), we obtain
 d ln e =  
Z N
0
piqi
e
d ln pidi 
"
NpNqN
e
  Nu(qN )R N
0 u
0(qi)qidi
#
d lnN
+
A(N)
b
R N
0 u
0(qi)qidi
d lnA(N),
which can then be rewritten as (26).
C.2. Variable b. When b depends on N , we can replace b with b(N) in the
compensated demand function (23), in the transformation identified in (16),
and in the utility constraint given by (21). Using A(N) = Na, the latter can be
rewritten as Z N
0
u(qi)di =
G 1(U) A(N)
b(N)
.
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Taking the rate of change of both sides, we have
u(qN )Nd lnNR N
0 u(qi)di
+
R N
0 u
0(qi)qid ln qidiR N
0 u(qi)di
=   A(N)d lnA(N)
b(N)
R N
0 u(qi)di
  d ln b(N). (39)
The first-order conditions for the expenditure minimization imply u0(qi)pj =
u0(qj)pi. Multiplying both sides by qj and integrating the resulting expression,
we have
u0(qi) =
pi
e
Z N
0
u0(qj)qjdj.
Plugging this expression into (39) yields
 
R N
0 piqid ln qidi
e
=
A(N)
b(N)
d lnA(N) +
hR N
0 u(qi)di
i
d ln b(N) + u(qN )Nd lnNR N
0 u
0(qj)qjdj
.
Finally, plugging this expression into (37), we obtain
 d ln e =  
Z N
0
piqi
e
d ln pidi 
"
NpNqN
e
  Nu(qN )R N
0 u
0(qi)qidi
#
d lnN
+
A(N)
b(N)
R N
0 u
0(qi)qidi
d lnA(N) +
R N
0 u(qi)diR N
0 u
0(qi)qidi
d ln b(N).
In the transformed ces case with symmetric varieties, we obtain
 d ln e = 1
  1
"
1+
a
b(N)q
 1

+ 
b0(N)N
b(N)
#
d lnN .
Appendix D. The relationship among  d ln e, compensating
variation, and equivalent variation
We show that the welfare change  d ln e may be viewed as the marginal
change in compensating variation (CV) or equivalent variation (EV). Thus,
using  d ln e to measure welfare changes is not driving our main results.
Let t  0 denote continuous time and consider the change in CV and EV
from time 0 to time t. Since w = 1 by choice of numeraire as in the existing
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literature, we have e(p0,N0,U0,A(N0), b(N0)) = e(pt,N t,U t,A(N t), b(N t)) =
w, so that CV can be expressed as
CV = e(pt,N t,U t,A(N t), b(N t))  e(pt,N t,U0,A(N t), b(N t))
= e(p0,N0,U0,A(N0), b(N0))  e(pt,N t,U0,A(N t), b(N t))
=
Z N0
0
p0i qi(p
0
i ,p
0,N0,U0,A(N0), b(N0))di
 
Z N t
0
ptiqi(p
t
i,p
t,N t,U0,A(N t), b(N t))di.
Note that U is evaluated at time 0 in both terms of the last equation. To obtain
a marginal change in CV, we differentiate this expression with respect to t and
evaluate it at t = 0 as follows:
dCV
dt

t=0
=   dN
t
dt
ptN tqN t(p
t
N t ,p
t,N t,U0,A(N t), b(N t))

t=0
 
Z N t
0
dpti
dt
qi(p
t
i,p
t,N t,U0,A(N t), b(N t))di

t=0
 
Z N t
0
pti
dqi(pti,p
t,N t,U0,A(N t), b(N t))
dt
di

t=0
.
Since all variables are evaluated at t = 0, we can suppress the time index by
letting N t = N0 = N as follows:
dCV
dt
=  dN
dt
pNqN  
Z N
0
dpi
dt
qidi 
Z N
0
pi
dqi
dt
di,
where we set qi = qi(pi,p,N ,U ,A(N), b(N)) for simplicity. Hence,
dCV
dt
=  NpNqN d lnNdt  
Z N
0
piqi
d ln pi
dt
di 
Z N
0
piqi
d ln qi
dt
di.
Noting that e = 1 by choice of numeraire, when all arguments are evaluated at
time t = 0, the above expression is equivalent to that of  d ln e as given by (37)
in Appendix C. We can then derive the welfare change to obtain Proposition 2.
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Turning next to EV, it is given by
EV = e(p0,N0,U t,A(N0), b(N0))  e(p0,N0,U0,A(N0), b(N0))
= e(p0,N0,U t,A(N0), b(N0))  e(pt,N t,U t,A(N t), b(N t))
=
Z N0
0
p0i qi(p
0
i ,p
0,N0,U t,A(N0), b(N0))di
 
Z N t
0
ptiqi(p
t
i,p
t,N t,U t,A(N t), b(N t))di.
Note that U is evaluated at time t in both terms of the last equation. To obtain
a marginal change in EV, we differentiate this expression with respect to t and
evaluate it at t = 0 as follows:
dEV
dt

t=0
=   dN
t
dt
ptN tqN t(p
t
N t ,p
t,N t,U t,A(N t), b(N t))

t=0
 
Z N t
0
dpti
dt
qi(p
t
i,p
t,N t,U t,A(N t), b(N t))di

t=0
 
Z N t
0
pti
dqi(pti,p
t,N t,U t,A(N t), b(N t))
dt
di

t=0
.
Since all variables are evaluated at t = 0, we can again suppress the time index
by letting N t = N0 = N as follows:
dEV
dt
=  dN
dt
pNqN  
Z N
0
dpi
dt
qidi 
Z N
0
pi
dqi
dt
di,
where we set qi = qi(pi,p,N ,U ,A(N), b(N)) for simplicity. Hence,
dEV
dt
=  NpNqN d lnNdt  
Z N
0
piqi
d ln pi
dt
di 
Z N
0
piqi
d ln qi
dt
di.
Noting that e = 1 by choice of numeraire, when all arguments are evaluated at
time t = 0, the above expression is equivalent to that of  d ln e as given by (37)
in Appendix C. We can then derive the welfare change to obtain Proposition 2.
To summarize, marginal changes in both CV and EV are equivalent to
 d ln e so that they can be used interchangeably.
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Appendix E. The “love of variety” condition
As mentioned in Section 4, when the transformation  depends on N , we
need to consider the “love of variety” condition to ensure that all available
varieties are consumed. To derive that condition, we consider the following
optimization problem:
max
fqi, i2[0,N ], Ng
U = G
Z N
0
 (u(qi),N)di

s.t.
Z N
0
piqidi = w,
qi  0, 8i 2 [0,N ],
N  Np,
where we have applied the equality constraint qi = 0 and thus  (u(qi),N) = 0
for all i 2 (N ,N ] to the original problem. Note that the consumers choose
not only the quantity of each variety consumed but also the range of varieties
consumed to take into account the impact of a new variety on the existing ones.
Without loss of generality, we order varieties such that pi is non-decreasing in
i. Let  and  be the multipliers associated with the budget constraint and with
the constraint on the range of varieties. The first-order condition with respect
to N is given by
(u(qN ),N) +
Z N
0
@(u(qi),N)
@N
di =
pNqN + 
G0() .
If all available varieties i 2 [0,Np] are consumed, the constraint on the range
of varieties must be binding at N = Np, i.e.,   0. Since G0 > 0, we then have
(u(qN ),N) +
Z N
0
@(u(qi),N)
@N
di  pNqN
G0() , (40)
where N is evaluated at Np. In that case, the first-order condition with respect
to qi is given by the equality
G0()@(u(qi),N)
@u
u0(qi) = pi, 8i 2 [0,N ]. (41)
Multiplying this expression by qi and integrating over [0,N ] then yield

G0() =
1
w
Z N
0
@(u(qi),N)
@u
u0(qi)qidi. (42)
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Plugging this expression into (40) yields
(u(qN ),N) +
Z N
0
@(u(qi),N)
@N
di  pNqN
w
Z N
0
@(u(qi),N)
@u
u0(qi)qidi. (43)
Using the definition in (27) we obtain the “love of variety” condition (28).
Assume that  is independent of N , as in Sections 2 and 3. Then, the second
term in the left-hand side of (43) is eliminated, so that
pNqN
w
Z N
0
@(u(qi),N)
@u
u0(qi)qidi  N .
which, using (42), can be rewritten as
pNqN
G0()   N . (44)
The first-order condition for the marginal varietyN is given by pN = G0()(
u)0(qN ). Plugging this into (44) yields the “love of variety” condition (29),
which always holds because   u is assumed to be concave.
When  depends on N , things are more complicated. The reason is that
choosing to consume a variety changes the value of all inframarginal varieties.
A rational consumer will take into account this additional effect. To see
this, consider an affine transformation (u(qi),N) = a+ b(N)u(qi), where b
depends on the mass N of varieties. In that case, (28) becomesZ N
0
hpNqN
w
b(N)u(qi)u,qi   b0(N)u(qi)
i
di  a+ b(N)u(qN ).
Rearranging the terms, we have
  a+ b(N)

pNqN
w
Z N
0
u0(qi)qidi  u(qN )

 b0(N)
Z N
0
u(qi)di. (45)
Using (42) and @(u(qi),N)/@u = b(N) and then (41) for the marginal variety
i = N , the second term of the left-hand side of (45) can be rewritten as
b(N)

pNqN
w
Z N
0
u0(qi)qidi  u(qN )

= b(N)

pNqN
w
w
G0()b(N)   u(qN )

= b(N)

pNqN
w
u0(qN )w
pN
  u(qN )

= b(N)qN

u0(qN )  u(qN )
qN

 0.
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Hence, when b0(N)  0, the “love of variety” condition (45) always holds since
a  0. Thus, it is redundant for our analysis in Sections 2 and 3. Yet, it need
not hold when b0(N) < 0.
Existing papers based on the ces subutility function allow for the case
with b0(N) < 0 (Benassy, 1996; Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003). Assume
that u(qi) = q
( 1)/
i . Since qi = p
 
i P (N)
 1w in the ces case, we have
pNqN/w = [pN/P (N)]1  and u(qi)/u(qN ) = (pi/pN )1 , so that the left-
hand side of equation (45) becomes
 a+ b(N)u(qN )
(
  1


pN
P (N)
1  Z N
0

pi
pN
1 
di  1
)
=  a  b(N)

u(qN ),
where we have used the definition of the price index P (N)1  =
R N
0 p
1 
i di.
Replacing the left-hand side of (45) with the forgoing expression and imposing
symmetry on qi, we then get (31). A sufficient condition for (31) to hold is
Nb0(N)/b(N)   1/. In that case, (31) holds for all a 2 [0,¥). The greater
the value of a, the more likely the “love of variety” condition (31) is satisfied.
As shown in Section 4, Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) assume that a = 0 and
consider the borderline case with Nb0(N)/b(N) =  1/.
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